General Motors is going through a metamorphosis, as you know. Actually, this isn’t the first time. GM 1.0 was the emergent GM—a collection of disparate and dysfunctional brands (Chevrolet, Oakland/Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick and Cadillac) and parts makers assembled before and immediately after WWI by William Durant and others. GM 2.0 is the professional GM created by Alfred Sloan, starting in 1923. Sloan and his successors created an organizational structure focused on distinct market segments bolstered by a culture of strong styling and R&D. GM 2.0 worked from the ‘20s through the ‘60s and generally is viewed as GM’s best incarnation. GM 3.0 is the cancerous GM beset by bad labor contracts, difficulty coping with international competition and excess capacity. GM 3.0 begins roughly with the oil crisis of 1973 and extends to 2009. GM 4.0 is the post-bankruptcy GM. This is part three in a series that covers issues with the direction of GM 4.0.
Oddly enough, some of the most perplexing questions I get asked by normal people as editor of an automotive publication involve Buick. Most of them are along the lines of “Why did GM keep Buick?” and “What the heck is a Buick anyway?” Not a great place to be, if you’re GM. GM knows it has an issue here in the U.S. (Buick, remember, is a hot brand in China) and it is attacking the problem. Buick recently announced the new 2010 Buick LaCrosse, a car that gives us a chance to think about how GM is and should be thinking of the future of the brand.
As I suggested in my last blog, with the off-loading of Saturn, Pontiac, Hummer, and Opel, GM has a cleaner brand lineup. Buick clearly needs to fall between Chevrolet at the low end and Cadillac at the high end in the new tripartite GM (I am assuming GMC remains and Chevy trucks are sold elsewhere). If Chevys are priced between $15 and $30k, and Cadillacs between $35 and $60k, Buicks should logically cost between $25 and $45k. These numbers aren’t exact; they represent the meat of the cars that will roll off dealer’s lots.